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ABSTRACT
The Myth of the Green Berets:
How One Group of Soldiers Helped Sell a Nation on the Virtue of War
by Rebekah W. Moore

While various types of American military units fought in the Vietnam War, a
disproportionate amount of media attention concentrated on one group: the Special Forces. More
commonly known as the Green Berets, these “elite” soldiers were lauded in the Vietnam era for
their foreign language skills, martial prowess, and mastery of unconventional warfare. Their
ability to live and work with local populations made them the favored–and famed–warrior
diplomats of President John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier. During the 1960s, the Green Berets
were featured in best-selling novels, a chart-topping song, comic book titles, action figures,
bubblegum cards, and a successful film. It was not only the American public who embraced
these elite soldiers, however. Military officials, government policy planners, and the media all
believed, to varying degrees, in the mythic abilities of the Special Forces. Deployed to Vietnam
with the expectation that they could solve political, social, and economic problems, they were
ultimately were unable to fulfill their mission. Even in defeat, however, the luster of the Green
Berets remained virtually undimmed and America could reimagine victory in the jungles of
Southeast Asia through John Rambo in the 1980s. An examination of these myths reveals the
deep, and dangerous, cultural roots that undergird notions of democratic progress, American
exceptionalism, and military interventionism, ideas that have found new life in the Global War
on Terror.
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Introduction
There are many popular culture icons of the 1960s—the Beatles, Andy Griffith, Batman,
Marilyn Monroe, and Barbie to name but a few. But one of the earliest and most enduring was
that of the Green Beret. Popularized during the presidency of John F. Kennedy, these U.S. Army
soldiers were lionized in comic books, novels, hit singles, movies, and bubble-gum machine
toys. But for all the popular culture artifacts and publicity, few military groups are as
misunderstood as the Special Forces.1 Are they the pachyderm-transporting humanitarians of
Operation Dumbo Drop or the avenging master of nature’s weapons from Rambo? This conflict
about the “true” mission of Special Forces is emblematic of larger, societal debates over the
nature of American military interventionism and those that fight on their nation’s behalf. Are
they diplomats in dungarees, bringing modernization in their wake or highly trained killers,
eliminating threats to our home front and way of life?
The popular myth of the Green Berets, first developed during the Vietnam era, was never
a static concept. Rather, it reflected differing ideas of American warfare and was broad enough
to reflect back onto the viewer his or her own ideas of American exceptionalism–ideas that
changed over time. In Kennedy’s New Frontier, these men represented the vanguard of the fight
against communism. Yet they were never simply well-trained soldiers. Their martial prowess
was presented, by Kennedy himself, primarily as the means by which they delivered social and
economic progress to “people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the

1

While these soldiers are officially known as “Special Forces,” popular culture and much of the scholarship use the
term “Green Berets.” Members of the Special Forces community, however, rarely refer to themselves as Green
Berets.

1

bonds of mass misery.”2 This image of the Green Berets as social warriors was a common
feature in early 1960s media, with numerous articles praising their multi-lingual, culturally
attuned abilities. However, these abilities were often overshadowed by language and images that
were more evocative of their lethality than their humanitarianism, a trend epitomized by the
publication of The Green Berets, a 1965 bestseller from Robin Moore which focused almost
exclusively on the male-fantasy heroics of these soldiers in Southeast Asia. Regardless of which
image more accurately portrayed the abilities of the Special Forces, they enabled both policy
makers and the American public to believe in the invincibility of our military endeavors, a trend
that continues to this day. For while counterinsurgency may have “withered after an initial
vogue,” as scholars in the 1970s noted, the Global War of Terror has returned it to a position of
prominence.3
The readiness with which the myth of the Green Berets was accepted by government
officials and the wider public can be explained by its linkage to older, deeply rooted myths: the
myths of the American frontier and the frontier hero. Historian Richard Slotkin defines myths as
“stories drawn from a society’s history, which have acquired through persistent usage the power
of symbolizing that society’s ideology and dramatizing its moral consciousness, with all of the
complexities and contradictions that consciousness may contain.”4 Though commonly thought of
as a binary construct—the enlightened settler versus “savage” native people—the frontier myth

2

John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961; transcript from John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and
Museum.
3
Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 128.
For examples of the continued fascination with Special Forces, see Harm Venhuizen, “How the Green Berets Got
Their Name,” Army Times, July 14, 2020, https://www.armytimes.com/off-duty/2020/07/14/how-the-green-beretsgot-their-name/; Doug Stanton, Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a Band of U.S. Soldiers Who Rode to
Victory in Afghanistan (New York: Scribner, 2010); Eric Blehm, The Only Thing Worth Dying For: How Eleven
Green Berets Fought for a New Afghanistan (New York: Harper Perennial, 2011); and Joe Kubert, Dong Xoai,
Vietnam 1965 (DC Comics, 2010).
4
Richard Slotkin, “Gunfighters and Green Berets: ‘The Magnificent Seven’ and the Myth of Counterinsurgency,”
Radical History Review, no. 44 (Spring 1989): 68.
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includes an additional component: separation from civilization.5 While initially this signified a
departure, and a distinction, from ancient and outdated European values and colonization efforts,
it also later represented leaving behind American cities and outposts to enter the purifying
wilderness of the frontier, where settlers confronted and overcame both nature’s primitiveness
and the savagery which ruled it. Mastery of these primal forces entitled the settlers to their noble
enterprise of western expansion.6
As the myth was inherently one of violent suppression, both of the wilderness and of the
people who had originally inhabited it, the frontier hero became an integral part of what was fast
becoming a national myth. Also referred to as the “monomythic superhero” or simply the
“gunfighter,” these men came to the aid of settlers threatened by unruly outlaws or savage
Indians.7 And while their exact values and skills changed over time, reflecting larger societal
shifts, the hero was consistently an outsider with legendary weapons’ prowess, particularly of
native weaponry, whose purity of motivation made all but inevitable his ultimate victory and the
deliverance of those on whose behalf he fought.8 While the frontier hero was a master of
violence, his use of it was justified by the morality of his cause; his violence was never wanton,
and his restraint lifted only when absolutely necessary.9 It was onto this mythic framework that
the Green Berets were to find themselves cast as the gunfighters of a new frontier.

5

See Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America (Norman, OK:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1998); and Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of
American Identity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).
6
On this topic, see Richard Slotkin, Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier,
1600–1860 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973).
7
Robert Jewett and John Shelton Lawrence, The American Monomyth (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday,
1977), 195; see Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, for a discussion of the gunfighter; and John Hellmann, American Myth
and the Legacy of Vietnam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) for a discussion of the frontier hero.
8
For an analysis of the hero narrative in Westerns, see Matthew Carter, Myth of the Western: New Perspectives on
Hollywood’s Frontier Nation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014). For the evolution of the frontier to
include space, see Janice Hocker Rushing, “Mythic Evolution of ‘The New Frontier’ in Mass Mediated Rhetoric,”
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 3, no. 3 (September 1986): 265-296.
9
See Jewett and Lawrence, The American Monomyth, 195; Carter, Myth of the Western, 37; and Hellmann,
American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam, 47.
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Scholars have long been fascinated by society’s obsession with the Vietnam-era Green
Berets. As early as 1984 they were referred to as the “soldier at the heart of the war,” whose
myth was representative of America’s “purpose and experience” in Vietnam.10 Most studies
focus on the manner in which President Kennedy manufactured and cultivated their mystique to
garner support for his counterinsurgency proposals, thus facilitating American involvement in
Vietnam.11 Some scholars take this a step further, arguing that President Kennedy’s use of myth
to support foreign policy was responsible for the magnitude of our disillusionment in defeat.12
John Hellmann examines the Green Beret as the “reincarnation of the western hero” in his larger
study on myth and Vietnam, arguing that our failure in Southeast Asia called into question the
very legitimacy of the frontier myth and that only through integrating the lessons of our errors
can we find our way to a new national narrative.13
As this study will argue, however, the Green Beret mythology reveals more than just one
president’s interest in counterinsurgency or a discrete period of time during which the country
marched, reinvigorated, into the landscape of the New Frontier. Rather, even through the
disillusionment of the post-Vietnam years, our belief in the myth of the frontier hero and his
redemptive quest was sustained and exposed by a continued belief in these soldiers. In such
1970s films as The Deer Hunter and Apocalypse Now—which one film scholar refers to as
“shattering and apocalyptic”—Green Berets continued to be portrayed as either the only soldiers
to emerge from the war unbroken or as the sole individuals who see through the lies to the

10

Alasdair Spark, “The Soldier at the Heart of the War: The Myth of the Green Beret in the Popular Culture of the
Vietnam Era,” Journal of American Studies 18, no. 1 (April 1984): 30.
11
See J. Justin Gustainis, “John F. Kennedy and the Green Berets: The Rhetorical Use of the Hero Myth,”
Communication Studies 40, no. 1 (1989): 41-53.
12
See Cindy Koenig, “The Story of the Green Berets: An Account of the American Monomyth,” Journal of the
Northwest Communication Association 32 (Summer 2003): 59-77.
13
Hellmann, American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam, 45.
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madness at the heart of America’s war in Vietnam.14 While popular culture of the 1980s and
1990s tended to portray them more as over-muscularized superheroes in action figures and
blockbuster movies, the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan brought them squarely back to their
Kennedy-era charm as the culturally savvy horse soldiers who rode to “victory” over the Taliban.
The Green Berets thus play an integral role in broader myth-making that historian
Andrew Bacevich argues helps sustain the “new American militarism.”15 This myth is not based
on one definitive frontier hero, but rather on many different versions of the American
frontiersman held by disparate groups: the public, government officials, the military
establishment, and individual soldiers themselves. An examination of these groups and how each
was enthralled by the promise of the Green Berets reveals more important truths about how
cultural assumptions influence the ways we formulate foreign policy and wage war. But the
mythology does more than just reveal these beliefs, it reinforces them. Thus, we see that when
the Green Beret mission in Vietnam failed to yield overwhelmingly favorable results, the soldiers
were able to blame their tradition-bound leaders, the military could blame the politicians or the
media, and the public could cast blame on any number of possible sources. Regardless of where
the blame lies, however, it can never lie with the men who wear the green beret, for they are
“us,” and “our” cause is the benevolent one of freedom, democracy, and progress.
Essential to understanding the mythology and its rapid spread within popular culture is an
awareness of the origins of this unconventional warfare organization and the missions for which
it was designed. After laying this foundation, this study will examine the shift to

14

Paula Willoquet-Maricondi, “Full-Metal-Jacketing, or Masculinity in the Making,” Cinema Journal 33, no. 2
(Winter 1994): 6.
15
Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 97. Bacevich is referring to American myth writ large, the “stories created to paper over
incongruities and contradictions that pervade the American way of life.” However, the frontier myth is, as
previously discussed, one of the most enduring of these myths.
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counterinsurgency warfare that was championed by the Kennedy administration. Government
documents and official speeches show the early and consistent focus President Kennedy placed
on counterinsurgency as part of his doctrine of flexible response to the threat of communist
aggression. Counterinsurgency was seen as a remedy to the warning posed in The Ugly
American, a 1958 book Kennedy admired and accepted at face value, along with the exhortations
of U.S. Air Force Colonel Edward Lansdale, whose ideas on counterinsurgency were also
integral to Kennedy’s appreciation of the doctrine. At the behest of the Commander in Chief, the
army moved to develop training programs and doctrine that would align with the new president’s
vision. Army publications show a desire to satisfy the president’s demand, even if they did not
indicate unanimous agreement with his strategy.
This discussion then lays the foundation for an examination of the creation and evolution
of the Green Beret mythology, which will be explored through a broad study of popular
American culture. Contemporary media reports, novels, a hit song, movies, toys, and comics
reveal the multitude of ways in which distinct groups were sold, and bought into, the myth of the
Green Berets. In many ways, this commodification of elite soldiers demonstrate how they came
to be known as “the soldier of the New Frontier,” as a U.S Army publication stated in 1961.16
Even those who propagated the myth oftentimes were seduced by it, as was author Robin Moore,
who in researching The Green Berets developed a lifelong passion for the men of the Special
Forces. Michael Cimino, the Academy Award-winning director of The Deer Hunter, claimed to
have been a “medic with a Green Beret unit,” and that these men had influenced the very spirit of

16

Charles A. Dodson, “Special Forces,” ARMY, June 1961, reproduced in Special Warfare, U.S. Army, Department
of the Army (US Government Printing Office, 1962), 52.

6

his film.17 However, it was later revealed that he had never had any connection with the Green
Berets, showing just how powerful their mythology remained, even in the 1970s, an era known
more for disillusionment of than admiration for the military.18 An exploration of these frequently
overlooked aspects of myth-making will contribute to a fuller understanding of the role myths
play in perpetuating society’s notions of militarism, masculinity, and cultural primacy.
While myth might be the “language in which a society remembers its history,” it is
dangerous for precisely that reason.19 A society remembers its history in the manner it desires,
which can be decidedly ahistorical. Therefore, in addition to exploring the development of the
myth of the Green Berets, it is critical that we also examine their history and the reality of the
war they fought in Vietnam. One window into this history is the monthly magazine published by
5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam. Running from 1966 until 1970, when the Civilian Irregular
Defense Group (CIDG) program was ended, they offer a remarkable view into the missions,
priorities, values, and mindset of the Special Forces soldiers. While these magazines present a
more informal vibe than do most unit publications, they are, nonetheless, official publications
and therefore present only the “truth” the commanders saw fit to present to their audience: the
operational vision Special Forces had of itself. These magazines will be supplemented with oral
histories, letters, memoirs, and poems written by Special Forces veterans. In conjunction, these
primary sources reveal a complicated relationship with the mythology. While some accounts
bolster the myth, other soldiers found themselves disillusioned by the disparity between their
perceived mission and the reality of the war they encountered. And disillusionment was not the

17

Michael Cimino, American Cinematographer 50, no. 10 (October 1978): 1032. Cimino repeated the claim in an
interview with the New York Times, see Leticia Kent, “Ready for Vietnam? A Talk with Michael Cimino,” New
York Times, December 10, 1978.
18
See Dave Itzkoff, “Michael Cimino, Director of ‘The Deer Hunter’ and ‘Heaven’s Gate,’ Dies at 77,” New York
Times, July 2, 2016.
19
Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 655.
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sole province of those who volunteered for Special Forces in the hopes of being a warrior of the
New Frontier. Many veterans who enlisted expecting to replicate the derring-do of Moore’s
novel were similarly frustrated by the unglamorous civic action projects they found themselves
involved in. This conflict exists at the heart of Special Forces and counterinsurgency warfare in
general.
Before beginning an examination of the mythology however, we turn first to the means
and purposes for which Special Forces was established.

8

1

The Origins of Special Forces and
Counterinsurgency Warfare
The Special Forces trace their origins to World War II and the Operational Groups of the

Office of Strategic Services (OSS).20 The OSS was a civilian organization, headed by William
“Wild Bill” Donovan, though it was primarily staffed with military personnel and reported to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. It had the strong support of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, support which
proved to be crucial for the relative successes the OSS teams achieved. Much of the military
leadership was averse to integrating them into operational planning due to the unconventional
nature, and civilian control, of the teams.21 The friction between the military brass and the OSS
is essential to understanding the subsequent development of the Green Berets myth, for this
romanticization of breaking free from the tradition-bound military mindset would later become a
fundamental element in the mythology.
While the OSS, writ large, was involved in various activities, such as espionage,
counterintelligence, and psychological warfare, it was the Operational Groups that were to prove
the progenitor of the Special Forces.22 Operating behind enemy lines as nuclei for guerrilla

20

See John Whiteclay Chambers II, OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II
(Washington, DC: US National Park Service, 2008), https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/oss/. While the
OSS Special Operations Branch was originally assigned the missions of “sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and
psychological operations,” the Operational Group Command was formed for the primary purpose of directing
guerrilla warfare, which resulted in some overlap in operational responsibility. However, unlike the covert two- to
three-man Special Operations teams which often included civilian operators, the Operation Group personnel were all
uniformed soldiers who worked in fifteen-man “sections” and received specialized training. See Nathan C. Hill,
“Sowing Dragon’s Teeth: OSS Operational Groups of World War II,” Military Review (July-August 2013), 33.
21
Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years, A History of the U.S. Army Special
Forces (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), 12-13.
22
Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, Rev. ed. (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas
Press, 2002), 35; Chambers, OSS Training in the National Parks, 1; and Michael McClintock, Instruments of
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warfare units, these unconventional warfare teams comprised personnel selected for their foreign
language abilities who were trained in the same skills that would come to make up the Special
Forces training curriculum: weapons, demolitions, close-quarters combat, communications,
parachuting, and organizing and training indigenous resistance groups.23
During World War II, OSS personnel were involved in a variety of guerrilla warfare
missions throughout Burma, North Africa, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Europe, and the
South Pacific, and many of the early proponents and leaders of Special Forces came from their
ranks.24 At the end of the war, the OSS was unceremoniously dissolved, never having gained the
legitimacy needed for inclusion into the larger military community. It would not be until the
advent of the Cold War that the unconventional capabilities the OSS had embraced in World
War II would once again be called upon.
In the early post-war years, as tension between the United States and the Soviet Union
mounted, unconventional warfare again became a subject of interest for military and civilian
planners.25 The National Security Council assigned responsibility for “subversion against hostile
states,” including supporting anti-Communist guerrillas, to the Central Intelligence Agency in
1948.26 However, the Army wanted no part in covert activities and moved first to rebuild its
psychological warfare capabilities.27 The Army Chief of Psychological Warfare, Brigadier
General Robert McClure, began planning for the development of a formal unconventional

Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990 (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1992), 26.
23
Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 28; Hill, “Sowing Dragon’s Teeth,” 33; see Chambers, OSS Training in the
National Parks, 52-83 for an interesting examination of National Parks sites used for training OSS personnel.
24
The most well-known of these are Robert McClure, Russell Volckmann, and Aaron Banks. See Melvin Russell
Blair, “Toughest Outfit in the Army,” Saturday Evening Post, May 12, 1956, 89.
25
Simpson, Inside the Green Berets, 16.
26
Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 68.
27
For a discussion of the Army’s aversion to covert operations, see McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft, 29; for a
detailed study of the history of the Army’s psychological warfare operations and the program’s instrumentality in
the genesis of Special Forces, see Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 118-139.
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warfare program, which would be “in the OSS pattern of tiny units with the prime mission of
developing, training, and equipping the guerrilla potential deep in enemy territory.”28 McClure’s
team, “hand-picked because of their background in guerrilla warfare,” according to one team
member, formulated doctrine, developed training plans, and prepared studies that culminated in
the activation of the first Special Forces group in 1952.29
If, as historian Roger Beaumont has argued, “modern elite units have been children of the
storm, products of crisis and instability,” then the Cold War is the father of Special Forces and
their earliest orientation was squarely upon Europe.30 Early recruiting efforts were split between
the United States and Europe, with one Army general complaining that the Pentagon was
“milking off resolute men of a distinctive breed for a cops-and-robbers outfit.”31 Word soon
spread of the new unit, approximately 800 slots were filled, and the 10th Special Forces Group
deployed to Bad Tolz, West Germany, ready to work with resistance groups behind the Iron
Curtain in the event of war.32
Because the mythology is heavily centered on the idea of these men as “guerrilla experts”
and the “best combat troops in the Army,” at least according to most media accounts, it is
necessary to examine their training to understand the origins of this belief.33 Colonel Aaron
Bank, the first commander of the Group, stated that he applied his OSS background to the

28

Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 120, quoting Colonel Aaron Bank.
Blair, “Toughest Outfit in the Army,” 89; and Paddock, U.S. Army Special Operations, 139.
30
Roger A. Beaumont, Military Elites (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1974), 4. Author and Special Forces
veteran Charles Simpson stated Special Forces was “born out of a fear of the universally expected World War III
and Soviet strength in Europe, bitter experience in Korea, interservice rivalry, and the beliefs and determination of a
handful of proponents.” Simpson, Inside the Green Berets, 18-19. Other works that mention the Europe-focused
orientation of the Special Forces’ early years include Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action:
The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 56-57; and Paddock, U.S. Army
Special Warfare, 153.
31
Blair, “Toughest Outfit in the Army,” 89.
32
Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action, 57; and Simpson, Inside the Green Berets, 34.
33
William Beecher, “Jungle Fighters,” Wall Street Journal, August 6, 1964; and “The Men in the Green Berets,”
Time, March 2, 1962, 18. For information on Special Forces training manuals during this period, see McClintock,
Instruments of Statecraft, 44.
29
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formation of Special Forces “training, doctrine, concepts, planning, standards, and goals. The
OSS legacy was our bible.”34 This meant the fifteen-man Operational Group was retained as a
foundational construct, though slightly modified into the eventual twelve-man team comprising
two officers and ten enlisted men.
All men were to be qualified parachutists, trained in their primary occupational specialty,
and cross-trained in the specialties of their teammates.35 This included communications,
demolitions, heavy and light weapons, field medicine, and operations and intelligence. Because
these teams would be based behind enemy lines, organizing and training guerrilla fighters, their
training necessarily included infiltration techniques, hand-to-hand combat, techniques of
instruction, escape and evasion, and other such skills. Prior to deployment, the team studied the
language and culture of the region and familiarized themselves with the operational
environment.36
The myth of the Green Berets is commonly understood as a Kennedy-era creation, but its
inception can be traced to the 1950s. There are almost no media accounts of the Special Forces in
the first year of the Group’s existence; it was not until 1953 that newspapers began mentioning
with any regularity the training, promotions, traffic accidents, and weddings of men assigned to
the 10th Special Forces Group.37 However, nothing was ever mentioned about what exactly

34

Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action, 56, quoting a letter from Bank to the author.
Officers did not receive the same level of training the enlisted men did, instead attending an officer’s
familiarization course. The training courses for occupational specialties varied in length according to the specialty,
but the overall training cycle lasted more than a year and was the longest for medics. See Simpson, Inside the Green
Berets, 36-38.
36
The initial teams did not receive language training, as many of the men were immigrants who spoke multiple
languages, giving “the outfit a Foreign Legion flavor,” according to one veteran. See Simpson, Inside the Green
Berets, 26.
37
See, for example, “Paratrooper Hero of Europe, Korea, Dies in his Car,” Boston Globe, April 9, 1953; “Model GI
to Visit Fort Mac,” Atlanta Constitution, May 7, 1953; “In Special Forces…,” Napa Valley Register, September 15,
1953; “2 GIs Killed, 3 Hurt as Truck Overturns,” Knoxville News-Sentinel, September 20, 1953; and “Sergeant
Views Top Levels,” Raleigh News and Observer, September 29, 1953.
35
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Special Forces was, or what they did, until 1954, when an Army spokesman was quoted saying
“the special forces groups (airborne) are cellular units organized to conduct operations within or
behind enemy lines, on a sustained basis, for military purposes.”38
By 1955, the “distinctive green beret” was remarked upon for the first time in the press as
the “trademark of special brand of new soldier.”39 One nationally-syndicated article included a
photograph of two men with rifles and binoculars, crouched in the snow, the “jaunty green beret
only he among all U.S. Army soldiers may wear,” lending a dashing air to the pair. The training
of the “Army’s most versatile soldier” was described in detail, as was his lineage to the OSS
teams, his ability to live off the land–“porcupine furnishes rich meat”–and speak multiple
languages.40 Of the journalists who did cover these modern frontier heroes, most focused on the
soldiers’ small unit operations, mastery of the wilderness, weapons’ skills, parachute training,
and missions into enemy territory. None of these early articles emphasize the Green Berets’
lethality or disregard for convention, conveying them instead in a somewhat chaste light.
This would all change with the publication of two Scripps-Howard newspaper articles in
1956 under the headlines “Men in Green Berets Are Deterrent to War” and “Killing Routine to
Green Berets.”41 In language that bordered on lurid, the author, Albert M. Colegrove, described
these men as “hard, lean fighters of many tongues and talents. Trained as sharp as a dagger’s
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point. Ready, now, if war comes, to plunge behind the Iron Curtain and fan the flames of
rebellion.” Their abilities were “astonishing” and their skills “an almost-incredible mixture of
those needed by the assassin, the frontiersman and the atomic-age soldier.”42 Colegrove did
cover their language skills and grueling training regimens, but his excitement is most evident
when he discussed the many different way these soldiers could kill: “swift, silent throat-cutting
in the dark” or “skull-cracking judo blow.”43 These articles are also notable because they are
based on a personal interview with the commander of the Special Forces training center, who
allowed Colegrove to inspect one of his teams and their equipment. Whether Colegrove was
given access for recruiting purposes or to raise public support for the fledgling organization,
Special Forces had officially stepped out of the shadows.44
By the mid- to late-1950s, the men of the Green Berets had become known as “Fort
Bragg’s guerrillas” and their training facility, the Psychological Warfare School, prepared and
updated Army field manuals on offensive guerrilla warfare.45 However, this did not
automatically translate into an acceptance of the counterguerrilla mission.46 In 1954, the
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Psychological Warfare School argued that “the tactics, doctrine and the conduct of anti-guerrilla
operations is not the responsibility or mission of Special Forces.”47 While this argument did not
prevail, it did mean that counterguerrilla warfare received little attention within Special Forces
until the 1960s.48 However, as military historian Andrew Birtle argues, a conflux of
developments in the years leading up to John F. Kennedy’s election resulted in a growing
acceptance within the Army of the importance of counterinsurgency doctrine, though this was by
no means a unanimous consensus.49 Nevertheless, Walt Rostow’s “modernization” theories of
economic development, decolonization, communist-backed revolutions, and ideas of limited
warfare all paved the way for the eventual ascendancy of President Kennedy’s support of
counterinsurgency and the Green Berets as the vanguard of military action.50
In July 1960, Kennedy delivered his New Frontier speech while accepting the
Democratic presidential nomination. Using mythical rhetoric, he spoke of a “new frontier” in
which American pioneers would battle threats and perils to realize novel promises and
opportunities. While this new frontier–much like the old–was full of hazards, the main danger
was the “single-minded advance of the communist system.” The nation had to meet this threat
squarely, proving to the world that American ideology would prevail for “mastery” of “men’s
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minds.”51 In his inaugural address in January 1961, Kennedy returned to the theme of American
exceptionalism triumphing over global threats. While avoiding specific reference to “battle” or
“communism,” he spoke of a “long twilight struggle” to defend freedom “in its hour of
maximum danger.” This was a historic engagement, one “only a few generations” had ever been
part of, and the import was clear: the world was watching and America had to prove her
worthiness.52
While these speeches gained national attention, much of Kennedy’s thinking on
counterinsurgency predated his election as president.53 By all accounts, he was determined to
avoid the mistakes of American foreign aid as represented in The Ugly American, a 1958
political fiction work by Eugene Burdick and William Lederer, that he publicly praised and
gifted to colleagues. Kennedy sought a more culturally sensitive interventionism, embracing the
ideas of Maxwell Taylor and Edward Lansdale.54 The imperative of maintaining flexibility in
responding militarily to communist aggression and countering it through actions and programs
designed to elicit goodwill would crystallize in his counterinsurgency policies as president.55 It
was this aspect of supposed benevolence and cultural awareness that was crucial in forming the
initial myth of the Green Berets.
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Upon taking office, Kennedy quickly moved to ensure the armed forces were prepared to
respond to communist-sponsored guerrilla warfare.56 Within two weeks of taking office, the
president requested that the Secretary of Defense “examine means for placing more emphasis on
the development of counter-guerrilla forces.”57 In response, an increase of 3,000 Special Forces
soldiers and a $19 million budget augmentation was proposed to develop “a counter-guerrilla
capability.”58 The conventional Army’s initial reluctance to embrace unconventional warfare
thus gave way before the new President’s sweeping counterinsurgency initiatives.59
Kennedy continued his advocacy for counterinsurgency before a Joint Session of
Congress on May 25, 1961. Again propounding the nation’s leadership role as the defender of
freedom, he returned to his martial campaign rhetoric and warned of the battle being waged for
“minds and souls” in the “whole southern half of the globe.”60 Heeding the exhortation of The
Ugly American, Kennedy placed a “new emphasis” on the “special skills and languages which
are required to work with local populations.” Kennedy requested additional funding for Special
Forces as part of a flexible response to counter communist aggression. Congress approved the
request and included an additional $7.5 million for research and development of Special Forces
equipment.61
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An additional element of this new type of warfare, as identified by the president while
speaking to the graduating class at West Point in 1962, was the inclusion of “diplomatic, political
and economic” problems into the military realm.62 The National Security Council called on the
armed forces to recognize the importance of “counter-insurgency problems” and to align their
“organization, training, equipment and doctrine” accordingly.63 As historian Richard Betts
describes it, “the services rushed to see which could accommodate [the president] fastest.”64
As early as 1960, the unconventional warfare community had noted in policy papers that
in revolutionary warfare the “assumption that the solution of the problem is solely a military one
has been proven erroneous.”65 Any operations undertaken to defeat local insurgents must
necessarily emphasize “political, psychological and economic actions.”66 However, this
additional aspect of counterinsurgency, the focus on addressing the root cause, was not
commonly understood, even within the Special Forces community. It was not until Kennedy’s
push for countering communist-led insurgencies that this distinction became clearer in Army
publications. Not only were these ideas incorporated into subsequent doctrine and training
manuals, but numerous Army-affiliated publications began highlighting Special Forces as the
preeminent counterinsurgency practitioners. One of these, the March 1962 edition of Army
magazine, featured a green beret on the cover over the caption “Big Push in Guerrilla Warfare:
The Army Beefs-up Its Counterinsurgency Posture.”67 The magazine featured an article written
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by General Maxwell Taylor titled “Our Changing Military Policy,” an article on Khrushchev’s
wars of national liberation, numerous articles on Special Forces and guerrilla warfare, and brief
biographies of the “young moderns” who were leading Special Forces.
Also in 1962, the Army published a large-format glossy booklet devoted to its special
warfare capabilities.68 A foreword by the Secretary of the Army told commanders to “draw upon
this material in their training and Troop Information programs, for proficiency in Special
Warfare is an indispensable requirement for the effective soldier and combat leader in today’s
Army.”69 Within the booklet were studies of guerrilla fighters throughout history, primers on
Mao and Che Guevara, a recommended reading list on counterinsurgency and unconventional
warfare, and a reprint of Walt Rostow’s speech at the Army Special Warfare Center.70 The
publication took pains to define common terminology, noting that counterinsurgency was a
combination of counter-guerrilla operations and “civic action.” This key term was soon to
become the buzz-word of Special Forces in Vietnam and was broadly defined as “any action
performed by military forces of a country, utilizing military manpower and skills in cooperation
with civil agencies, authorities, or groups, that is designed to improve the economic or social
conditions of that country.”71
The main focus of the booklet was the training, capabilities, and missions of the Green
Berets–the “soldier of the New Frontier.”72 While these men are praised as “pioneer types,” the
Army clearly attempted to downplay any notion of Special Forces as “outside” the conventional
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Army. They are a “strictly military outfit,” subject to “the same disciplinary code as other
soldiers.”73 The publicity they have received is “unfortunate” and inaccurate, for the Special
Forces soldier wears an “ordinary combat uniform,” and is “neither a commando nor a cloakand-dagger agent,” but a conventional soldier with an unconventional mission.74 Despite these
efforts to assuage conventional commanders that Special Forces worked within the military
structure, the growing public interest in the Green Berets and the media spotlight that was soon
to shine on them would only increase tensions in the years to come.
President Kennedy’s visit to Fort Bragg in October 1961 played a critical role in
establishing the mythology of the Green Berets, for it is after this visit that he issued the order
that made the green beret part of their official uniform. While Kennedy spent a majority of his
visit reviewing and addressing conventional units, his visit included a forty-minute
demonstration by the Special Warfare Center and School.75 A series of parade-style trailers
commenced the proceedings, with men and equipment showcasing different Special Warfare
capabilities, such as Special Forces training and team configurations, elements of
counterinsurgency warfare, civic action projects, and psychological operations. Demonstrations
then began of hand-to-hand combat techniques, rappelling, scuba insertion, and a simulated
guerrilla attack. The show culminated with a fanciful demonstration of a backpack rocket and a
leaflet-drop featuring the president’s image with the words “Mr. President you call the tune.”76
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Scholars debate whether Kennedy’s visit was a publicity stunt by the president to drum
up media interest in the Green Berets or an attempt by the military to sell the president on the use
of Special Forces. In reality, it was probably both. Kennedy’s interest in the Green Berets
predated his trip to Fort Bragg and he took a personal interest in them, commanding they wear
their berets for his visit.77 Likewise, Special Forces offered the Army a means of implementing
the president’s counterinsurgency mandate, allowing them to secure missions and funding that
might have been diverted elsewhere. Two months after Kennedy visited Fort Bragg, the
Department of the Army officially authorized Special Forces to wear the green beret, linking
forever the young president and these elite soldiers in American military mythology.78
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The Creation of the Green Beret
Myth, 1961-1964
The first media coverage of Special Forces during the Kennedy administration began

appearing only a few months after his election and read primarily like joint press releases from
the White House and Pentagon. In March 1961, an article in Time stated that Special Forces
“blossomed from the shadows” after Kennedy commanded the Pentagon to increase its
unconventional warfare capabilities. The “guerrillas” of the Special Forces were presented as
versatile warriors, skilled in all manner of weapons systems, even able to “talk knowingly about
the principal Hungarian poets” should they deploy to Hungary. Their goal was to “elicit support
from the local people by promises, threats, bribes, or by any other means.”79 The notion of
winning hearts and minds through good deeds or social reform projects had yet to make an
appearance in the media coverage.
Popular Science also entered the pop culture craze, publishing an article that same year
that highlighted the equipment and training of Special Forces and included many patently false
statements, including calling them “teach-and-run soldiers” who “will never fire a shot at the
enemy.”80 Another erroneous claim was that each Special Forces soldier would undergo every
conceivable specialized training program, including arctic and jungle training, mountaineering,
amphibious training, underwater demolitions, and ski training.81 By late 1961, Esquire noted the
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stream of journalists who visited Fort Bragg had become steady enough to warrant “a standard
show” for visiting television cameramen and magazine photographers.82 The New York Times
called the emblem of the Special Forces “the Army’s leading status symbol.”83
Esquire took a different tack in its coverage, scoffing at media portrayals of the Green
Berets as “a bunch of supermen” or “superspies.” Instead, the magazine highlighted the
unconventional nature of Special Forces and the animosity this engendered within the
conventional Army. The reader was left with a thrilling impression that this group of
“extraordinary soldiers,” the stepchildren of Fort Bragg, were above the petty military concerns
of starched uniforms and garrison duties. Also noted was their ability to serve in
“underdeveloped areas” of the world, as had the heroes of The Ugly American.84 While
development projects received only a brief mention, it was one of the first times that civic action
was linked to Special Forces in the media.
For the most part, this early coverage did not mention counterinsurgency and its
complementary socio-economic aid programs. Special Forces were instead presented as soldiers
who fought as guerrillas against guerrillas or who trained others to do so.85 Medical aid was
simply a means “to opening up a village for anti-guerrilla training,” as a 1962 article in
Commonweal explained.86 Time magazine noted that “carousing and consorting with native
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women” was taboo, as “support of the local populace” was essential to the success of the Special
Forces’ guerrilla mission.87 Good deeds were thus seen as a means of securing access, not as part
of a larger strategy of building confidence in the local government. Also rare in these early years
was the use of the term “Green Berets.” “Special Forces” continued to be the term preferred by
the media in the early 1960s.
One publication that offered a detailed look into Special Forces during these relatively
early years, and the politics of counterinsurgency, was the Saturday Evening Post. An April 1962
article, “Hot Weapon in the Cold War,” claimed the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been caught
unprepared by Kennedy’s interest in guerrilla warfare. It was only “under prodding” that they
“rallied to the idea of using Special Forces.” The article cited Army field manuals and training
handbooks, quoted Walt Rostow and Brigadier General Edward Lansdale, and repeated the
assertions made in Popular Science of the training and wide-ranging expertise of “the finest
soldiers in the United States Army.”88 While the term counterinsurgency was never used, the
social and political reforms necessary to counter guerrilla warfare were clearly laid out. And the
source of these reforms was without doubt, for in the view of “most of the Special Forces men,
the Army is the natural vehicle for progress in the underdeveloped world.”89
The images that frequently accompanied these articles contributed to a growing public
interest in these “stealthy marauders” who wore the green beret.90 There were two distinct
elements to this imagery, the first of which was the Special Forces’ apparent embracing of a
more primitive form of frontier warfare. Unlike media coverage of conventional military units,
these were small groups of men, whose wilderness skills lent the articles an air of wistfulness, as
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if they existed outside of cities and suburbs and the workaday drudgery of corporate life. Almost
none of the photographs showed massive weaponry, large groups, or signs of civilization.91 They
were primarily shots of a lone soldier–or a small number of them–communing with nature in her
various elements: the woods, the water, or the air. A soldier was pictured eating a snake,
parachuting over a pristine snow-clad landscape, diving in a mountain lake, rappelling down a
cliff, or training in the forest.92 The imagery was that of Daniel Boone or Davy Crockett, men at
ease in the wild frontier. The contrast to the American corporate white-collar manager could not
have been clearer.
The second element of the imagery was the martial mastery of Special Forces soldiers.
They might have been frontier soldiers, but they were modern frontiersmen who had brought the
weapons of progress with them. Images of sophisticated infrared lamps and goggles, demolitions
gear, radio equipment, and machine guns of all types established the Green Berets as the new
kings of the wild frontier. But they were not merely masters of modern weaponry. Rather, as the
articles made clear, these warriors had “a detailed knowledge of weapons ranging from the bow
and arrow to the howitzer.”93 The perfect fusion of the tribal and the modern, the Green Beret
was set to update frontier mythology in his image.
By the mid-1960s, Americans knew that Special Forces teams had been sent to Vietnam
and that they were more than just advisors. The March 1963 cover of the Saturday Evening Post
featured a Green Beret outside a burning village with the caption “I’m hit, I’m hit.” The article
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reminded readers that “Americans are fighting a war in Vietnam,” against “Communist guerrillas
who hope eventually to take over all of Southeast Asia.” Over fourteen pages of text and color
photographs told the story of two Special Forces teams and the outposts they had established to
beat back the threat. One of the outposts, described as “a front in the midst of enemy territory on
the wild tropical frontier,” was code-named “Nashville Frontier.”94 The men played poker at
night, bathed in streams whose serenity was broken only by sniper fire, patrolled the wilds of the
jungle with native tribesmen, and fought back enemy attacks. Even in this early stage of
involvement in Vietnam, Special Forces faced down the many foes who would soon become
familiar to the American public: Army bureaucracy, guerrilla infiltration of village defense
forces, and the deficiencies of the Vietnamese government.95 For an American public fearful of
the global advance of communism, the Green Berets offered some small satisfaction that action
was being taken to stem the tide.
Media coverage also began stressing the civic action programs implemented by Special
Forces in such articles as “Fighting Is Secondary to Army Special Forces.” Published in the New
York Times, the article noted the “prevailing reputation” of the unit as a “Gung Ho outfit,” but
highlighted instead the training of these “elite soldiers” for a “delicate type of international
diplomacy that few State Department officers get a chance to practice.” While direct action was
still a part of their mission, the article stressed that Special Forces mostly conducted medical
training and outreach, schooling, and sanitation and construction projects.96
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The duality of their image, as both peerless warriors and soldier diplomats, allowed a
broad cross-section of the public to support America’s growing involvement in Vietnam. Even
New York Times reporter David Halberstam, an early critic of America’s strategy in Vietnam,
wrote glowingly of the Green Berets in numerous articles published during this period.97 These
“tough” men seemed “completely indifferent to danger” and had built their outpost in Dak Pek
much as a “select crew of planners might build a village on a prairie.”98 He wrote of another
Special Forces team, who lived in a compound nicknamed “Little Dienbienphu,” as having an
“awesome reputation” among the Vietnamese and Cambodians.99 Halberstam claimed the
“Special Forces program has been successful beyond the expectations of even its most
enthusiastic planners.” He credited this success to Special Forces’ recognition of the “social,
political and medical as well as the military aspects” of their efforts.100
Despite the media coverage, the Green Berets would not saturate pop culture until after
the publication of Robin Moore’s book in 1965. However, these earlier years witnessed them
making increasing appearances in films, television shows, and children’s toys. One such toy,
manufactured by Mattel, was a “Guerrilla Gun” that appeared in the 1963 Sears Catalogue. The
gun fired in either single-shot or burst mode and could also be purchased in a set which included
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a knife, camouflage poncho, and green beret for children to add guerrilla fighting to their
repertoire of war play.101
Dell Publishing began releasing its Jungle War Stories comic books in 1962. Set in
Vietnam and Laos, the stories centered around three American Special Forces “advisors” who
fought communist guerrillas wherever they encountered them.102 Always outnumbered and
frequently betrayed by ostensible allies, the Green Berets defeated their enemies more through
clever schemes and ingenuity than by superior firepower.103 They gained the trust of villagers
and tribesmen by demonstrating their goodwill and purity of motives. In “Operation Mongrel,”
Captain Duke Larsen befriends Meo tribesmen by showing them an American flag, “the one
thing they respect.” The tribesmen help the team defeat the attacking enemy rebels of the Pathet
Lao and then haul the team’s military gear on dog sleds to their final objective.104 In another
story, set in Vietnam, a group of farmers use tactics taught to them by “a Yankee advisor” to
defend their village against “maggots from the North.”105 The evident frontier imagery
transposed the plains of the American West onto the jungles of Southeast Asia, where Green
Berets served as gunslingers for threatened pioneer settlements.
The early film and television appearances of the Green Berets were, for the most part,
minor roles. These appearances, however, demonstrate a growing public interest in Special
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Forces and in their missions. In 1962, Surfside 6 featured an episode, “The Green Beret,” in
which private investigator Dave Thorne was recalled to active duty to help train a Special Forces
team–and identify a saboteur at a domestic nuclear installation. After completing the mission, he
was presented with an honorary green beret. When his friend asked if she could have it, as it was
“kind of cute,” he replied, “Are you kidding? After what I went through to get this, just let
anybody try and take that away from me.”106 An episode of the Twilight Zone, “In Praise of Pip,”
began in Vietnam, when a Green Beret officer brought a wounded soldier into a field hospital
after he had been injured during an enemy ambush. When the soldier’s father heard the news, he
remarked in dismay, “My kid is dying in a place called South Vietnam. There isn’t even
supposed to be a war going on there, but my son is dying.”107 While Surfside 6 showcased the
Green Berets in their original role as anti-Soviet guerrillas, by the time the Twilight Zone episode
aired, the following year, Green Berets and their more expansive mission in Southeast Asia were
gaining increasing attention in the media spotlight.108
The Green Berets made their appearance on the big screen in 1964 in Seven Days in May,
a political thriller about a military coup d’état, adapted from the best-selling book by the same
name.109 The plot centered around a top-secret military installation guarded and staffed almost
exclusively by Green Berets, who were presumably unaware of the machinations of their
superiors. The deputy commander of the base–a Green Beret–discovered the plot and risked his
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life to help the president’s ally escape the site and report back to the president, preventing the
coup.110 While the film was not a nuanced depiction of Special Forces, the movie illustrated the
ways in which filmmakers already were beginning to use these soldiers to indicate both the
unconventional and the heroic. However, there remained a somewhat muddled notion of what
these men actually did: were they supermen, superspies, or soldiers of social development? This
confusion would persist in media depictions through the decade.
Outside the comic books and movie theaters, the actual U.S. Army Special Forces first
deployed to Vietnam in 1957, where they trained conventional South Vietnamese forces in
unconventional, offensive warfare.111 However, by 1961, their primary mission had shifted to
supporting the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program, in which marginalized
minority groups were organized and trained as guerrilla fighters.112 First envisioned as a
defensive program, Special Forces teams moved into remote villages, offering medical care and
small aid programs to gain political support of the people. While the implementation varied from
village to village, the essential elements were to help construct simple defensive perimeters and
equip and train local forces in basic fighting techniques.113 The official history of Special Forces
in Vietnam referred to the CIDG program as “an amalgamation of many little programs, all of
which aimed at the protection of and development of minority groups against insurgency.”114
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The CIDG program was implemented under CIA authority until 1963, when the Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) assumed control. This handover marked a transition in
the program away from defensive hamlets to offensive operations and border surveillance patrols
launched from increasingly fortified compounds.115 As the program became more firmly
established, and the American military presence in South Vietnam grew, Special Forces teams
also began implementing larger civic action projects. These included construction of small
medical facilities, schools and roads, improving agricultural and livestock yields, and digging
wells.116 It was this aspect of the Green Berets, what historian Heather Stur calls the “gentle
warrior,” that helped establish the groundwork of the mythic hero of the Vietnam War.117 As the
Saturday Evening Post proclaimed, the trademark of Special Forces was not their martial
prowess but rather their ability to combine the use of force with “the doing of good works, the
bringing of medical care and all the other arts of progress.”118 They were the military
embodiment of Kennedy’s New Frontier, meeting the communist threat in the jungles of
Vietnam and defeating it by winning the “hearts and souls” of the people.
And this media coverage encouraged young men to join the Green Berets. One of those
who enlisted was Robert Shippen, who “wanted to get involved,” wanted to be “one of
Kennedy’s youth.” He believed that America was in a “sometimes hot war with the communists
and that we were a beacon of light for humanity.” He saw the conflict in Vietnam as a part of
that struggle, that “the Vietnamese Communists were invading our allies in the South,” that the
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communists were “really the enemy.”119 Shippen went to an Army recruiting station, saw the
posters on the wall, including one of a “Hollywood shot of a Green Beret,” who was laying in the
woods and holding a rifle–wearing his green beret–and Shippen decided to enlist.120 He wanted
to try for Special Forces, to “try for the best and see how far” he might get. Shippen trained as a
Special Forces medic and deployed to South Vietnam, where he hoped “to save the poor,
oppressed people.”121
The media spotlight that shone on the Green Berets in the Kennedy era was due to a
combination of efforts by both Special Forces commanders and the president himself. Special
Forces command had been attempting to drum up public interest in their organization since as
early as 1954, the same year they began accepting direct enlistments into the program. But the
Green Berets also profited from a growing curiosity among the American population that was
fueled by popular media outlets. This is amply illustrated by the numerous photographs of
Special Forces soldiers–their training, gear, and weapons–and the official quotes by senior
commanders that appeared regularly in the media’s coverage.122 These articles began appearing
half a decade prior to Kennedy’s election and indicate the creation of the Green Beret myth
cannot be attributed solely to the president.
Kennedy, however, undeniably was fascinated by these soldiers and his interest went
beyond that of mere propaganda.123 After the president’s assassination, Robert Kennedy
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personally requested Green Berets for the president’s honor guard, as he “was aware of his
brother’s particular interest in them.”124 The president’s widow likewise requested that a platoon
of Special Forces soldiers be added to the funeral procession. Ultimately, they not only stood
guard over Kennedy’s casket in the White House and marched beside it during the procession,
but they also flanked the final walkway to his gravesite.125 This inclusion of Green Berets in the
slain president’s memorial services indicates an interest that went beyond simple media
manipulation. As historian Steven Watts argues, Kennedy’s fascination with Special Forces was
reflective of the “broader masculine mystique of the New Frontier.”126 The fascination of the
American public with the Green Berets, meanwhile, was just beginning.
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3 The Enshrinement of the Myth, 19651968
As conventional American ground combat troops began to deploy to Vietnam in
increasing numbers during the spring and summer of 1965, media coverage of Special Forces
remained strong. Green Berets were featured on the covers of National Geographic and the
Saturday Evening Post in 1965 and the New York Times continued to highlight the
accomplishments of various Special Forces teams throughout Vietnam.127 While civic action
projects and language skills were still frequently mentioned, the battlefield exploits of Special
Forces soldiers became a more common subject for writers. With more and more combat
engagements between Americans and Vietnamese communists, this should not come as a
surprise. The Saturday Evening Post, for instance, told the “gripping story of how twelve heroic
Americans defended one tiny outpost of freedom against a major Viet Cong attack.”128 The
article included a picture of President Lyndon Johnson awarding the Congressional Medal of
Honor to the Special Forces captain, Roger Donlon, who commanded the team.129
But Green Berets exhibited more than just conventional battlefield heroics, as a profile of
Captain Vernon Gillespie in National Geographic demonstrated. The article portrayed the
“superbly trained and superbly disciplined” soldiers of a Special Forces team whose “raw
127
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heroism” and “awesome display of personal courage” halted a revolt of mountain tribesmen.130
While his bravery was undeniable, Gillespie had ultimately won the day through his keen
understanding of the “mountain people” whom he had “been sent to guide and protect.”131 By
donning tribal garb and participating in a ceremony that bound him to other village fighters–
actions that a “lesser man” would not “have realized the necessity of, or taken the time for”–
Gillespie had averted a disaster.132
Special Forces were showing Americans that in Vietnam, the lessons of The Ugly
American had been taken to heart. Soldiers wearing green berets lived among the people, eating
the same food, fighting the same battles, and laboring to help local tribes on the path to freedom
and development. And this contest over local political loyalties mattered. A large majority of the
U.S. public in 1965 believed that South Vietnam would be lost to the communists without
American support.133 The adulatory media coverage of the Green Berets allowed one to feel not
only that something was being done to prevent communist aggression, but that it was being done
in the right way–the modern, enlightened way.
The publication of The Green Berets, in May 1965, rocketed Special Forces to new
heights of popularity. Written by Robin Moore, the best-selling novel cemented the term “green
beret” in the public consciousness for decades to come.134 Though Moore’s work was published
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as fiction, the first sentence of the novel claimed otherwise: “The Green Berets is a book of
truth.”135 Comprising nine stories, each of which purported to tell “a different facet of Special
Forces action,” there was no shortage of death, torture, sex, and intrigue in Moore’s writing.
Leaving the “civic action portion of Special Forces operations” to another writer, one
comfortable with simple factual reporting, Moore boasted that he “saw too many things,” and
“assisted in too much imaginative circumvention of constricting ground rules” to be bound by
the constraints of nonfiction.136
The national media outlets who reviewed The Green Berets did so only after it was well
established on the best-seller list; their reviews were almost universally censorious. The Chicago
Tribune said Moore should have forgone “claims to facts” and stuck to spinning “yarns.” Their
review noted that the villains in The Green Berets are “Americans who abide by regulations,
most Vietnamese officers, and all American officers not in the special forces.”137 The New York
Times thought Moore’s “vividly unpleasant” stories demonstrated “an addiction to cruelty that
makes Vietnamese and Americans in the jungle kin.”138 A review in Time wondered that
“Moore’s Special Forces men seem to spend little time on the humdrum public health and
education programs and antiguerrilla training that are among the SF’s major responsibilities.”139
Indeed, the soldiers of Moore’s Green Berets paid but lip service to the ideals of
Kennedy’s New Frontier. Moore noted in passing that the Special Forces medical program was
“winning over” whole villages, but much more space was devoted to detailing prisoner
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interrogation techniques, the cut-off date for visiting prostitutes before returning home to wives
and girlfriends, and the value of assassinating political officials.140 Moore also wrote that
“Special Forces men are entirely conversant with tribal mores and superstitions,” though in two
of his stories, this translated into graciously accepting young tribeswomen into bed.141
An examination of the media coverage of The Green Berets reveals a divergence of
opinion in the reviews between the national and local media. While the national media dismissed
Moore’s work as both insulting and shocking, smaller media outlets were largely admiring. A
reviewer in Texas said Moore’s stories are “reminiscent of the best of Ernie Pyle” with an
“added dash of James Michener color and James Bond excitement.”142 “Most Important Book of
1965?” was the question asked in the Tennessean, in which the reviewer stated, “for the first time
the war in Viet-Nam takes shape in dramatic and explosive form that can be grasped by any
reader of any age.”143
Even those reviewers in lesser markets who found the literary value of Moore’s book
wanting still recommended it and lauded the Special Forces as “the first successful answer short
of total nuclear annihilation we have found to the Moscow-Peiking cancer.”144 Another reviewer,
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this one in Fort Lauderdale, described Special Forces as “spectacularly non-ugly Americans.”145
Without question, there was a sense in these narratives that Vietnam was a different kind of war,
and as Americans struggled to make sense of it, they praised the Green Berets as the men who
had mastered this new, dirty style of modern warfare. One reviewer described the war, as fought
by the men of The Green Berets, as cold-blooded, devious, and intimate.146 In a review that
dismissed Moore’s “hero-worship” of the Green Berets as “straight off the Warner Bros.” grade
B movie lot, a California reviewer nevertheless found the book “fascinating,” because “that’s the
kind of war it really is.”147 A librarian in New Mexico noted much the same. Warning readers
Moore’s stories “will shock the prudish and nauseate the squeamish,” she nevertheless believed
“they picture war as it is now being fought in the jungles of Asia and jungle warfare is never
pretty.”148
There were additional elements to the coverage as well that gave the book a frisson of the
forbidden. One of these was the charge by military officials that The Green Berets contained
sensitive information.149 The New York Times published an article detailing the controversy,
noting that the Pentagon, CIA, and other government agencies had “taken exception to the
book.”150 The government’s objections centered on the novel’s stories of cross-border
operations, torture, and the contempt with which Moore’s Americans treated their Vietnamese
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partners. The San Francisco Examiner covered the controversy in “Pentagon Brass vs. Green
Berets,” noting that while The Green Berets was mostly ignored in “major review media,” the
book was in its sixth printing two months after its release and was doing “swingingly in San
Francisco.” The article, and many like it published around the nation, claimed the Pentagon’s
objections to the novel stemmed not from national security concerns but from the hatred that
“conventional military minds” had for “the bizarre, the unconventional, the outside-of-channels
operation” of Special Forces.151 The military’s concerns over Moore’s novel merely fanned the
flames of the public’s interest in the Green Berets–both the real life soldiers and their fictional
counterparts. And this depiction of Green Berets as rule breakers who rose above such petty
notions as international boundaries and conventional rules of engagement, and who thrived
despite the best efforts of the strait-laced military brass, was intoxicating to many Americans.
Robin Moore, one of the people most responsible for establishing the myth of the Green
Berets, was also one of its first victims. Because he admired them and thought of himself as one
of them, he could not imagine that they might fail. In his mind, if the Green Berets had been
allowed to operate without constraints, without being “hamstrung by politicians,” they would
soon have had “Uncle Ho” at the bargaining table.152 As one former Special Forces
noncommissioned officer wrote of Moore’s novel, the author “painted a picture of Special Forces
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as they might once have been and as they would like to be–but not as they are.” In other words,
Moore helped perpetuate “a Special Forces self-created myth.”153
Moore’s daughter also spoke of the myth’s allure, noting of her father that the Special
Forces was “the thing he kept returning to.”154 This was literal as well as figurative, for when
Moore retired, he bought a home near Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to be near the men of 5th
Special Forces Group. Saying “this is home,” Moore helped fund a “clubhouse” for Green
Berets, whose members considered him their “icon.” They kept a bottle of scotch ready at all
times for him, their version of “Kennedy’s eternal flame.” Moore lived the rest of his life, as he
had intended, “in the embrace” of his Special Forces brethren.155 When he died, Major General
Gary Harrell, deputy commanding general of Special Operations Command, said Moore’s
“writings on Special Forces are textbooks for our modern unconventional warriors; they were
both educational and inspirational and introduced the world to the Green Berets.”156 That the
public might have considered The Green Berets a work of fact is disturbing enough, but for
military commanders in the twenty-first century to call it “inspirational” is downright chilling.
Moore’s role as mythmaker equally can be discerned in modern day scholarship on the
Special Forces and the American war in Vietnam, both of which often cite self-aggrandizing
claims of the novelist as unchallenged fact. One of these is that Moore had a security clearance
which the Army revoked in its displeasure over The Green Berets. However, evidence suggests
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that Moore may never have had any such clearance and that he only ever held press
accreditation.157 Another oft-cited assertion is that the success of Moore’s book allowed the
Selective Service to “suspend draft calls during the first four months of 1966.”158 While some
number of enlistments surely were inspired by Moore’s adventure-filled tales of the Special
Forces, there is no evidence that they were of sufficient quantity to affect induction rates.159
Thus, even today, scholars who study the Special Forces and the role of Moore’s novel are
unwittingly feeding the myth themselves.
While it is unclear who exactly authorized Moore to train with Special Forces, or to tag
along with them in Vietnam, it ultimately was a brilliant publicity move. The exact number of
enlistments Moore’s novel inspired are impossible to ascertain, but its cultural impact went

157

As recently as 2017, this claim was cited in an academic publication with no supporting evidence, other than
Moore’s word. See Roger Lander, “Barry Sadler and ‘The Ballad of the Green Berets,’” in The Vietnam War in
Popular Culture: The Influence of America’s Most Controversial War on Everyday Life, vol. 1, During the War, ed.
Ron Milam (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2017), 157. However, Arthur Sylvester, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs, claimed in an interview that Moore “wasn’t cleared for secret information at any time, for anything.”
Sylvester said it was likely Moore had confused his press accreditation with a security clearance. See Sylvester,
interview, 2. Moore’s claims can be found in the introduction to the 1999 edition of his book. See Robin Moore, The
Green Berets (New York: Skyhorse, 2015), xi-xii. While the full truth may never be known, by not citing both
accounts of the story, Moore is portrayed as yet another victim of the conventional military’s distaste for Special
Forces.
158
The first academic source for Moore’s claim regarding the draft is found in Hellmann, American Myth and the
Legacy of Vietnam, 53. Others who cite Hellmann include Koenig, “The Story of the Green Berets,” 72; and
Gustainis, “John F. Kennedy and the Green Berets,” 50.
159
Enlistment numbers varied considerably in the first year of the troop buildup in Vietnam. The January 1966 draft
call was cut by 1,000 men, February’s by 5,000, and March’s by 10,300 men. However, April’s enlistments were
down, leading the Defense Department to raise draft calls by a total of 9,500 men in May and June. See Bob Horton,
“May, June Draft Quotas Raised Without Notice,” Petaluma Argus-Courier, June 4, 1966. Analysts believed the
high numbers of enlistees in the early part of 1966 were due to a combination of lowered admission standards and
men who were draft motivated to enlist in the service of their choice. See “Enlistments Near Record Set Last Fall,”
Baltimore Sun, February 27, 1966. While these are national numbers, some states did have sufficient enlistments to
be able to cancel their draft quotas in certain counties. For instance, Comanche County, Oklahoma, had enough
enlistments in February 1966 to cancel the March draft call. See Virgil Gaither, “Rush of Recruits Halts Draft Calls
in County,” Lawton Constitution, February 25, 1966. It is possible that Moore saw a local report of a draft
cancellation and attributed this to his novel’s success. However, when enlistments rose, they rose for all services, not
just for the Army. For example, the Army saw an increase in its enlistment numbers in January 1966 that was 118
percent above January 1965. For the same period, the Marines saw their numbers rise by 165 percent. It therefore
seems unlikely that the enlistment rise was due mainly to Moore’s novel, especially as January is “traditionally the
top enlistment month.” See “Enlistments Near Record Set Last Fall,” Baltimore Sun, February 27, 1966.

41

beyond sheer recruitment numbers.160 Apart from a comic strip and a hit movie that were directly
tied to The Green Berets, numerous commercial spin-off products appeared in the years that
followed. Multiple Green Beret-inspired novels appeared on sales racks, both for men and
women, depicting the romance of the warfare in Southeast Asia and the Special Forces soldiers
who fought there.
The Women of the Green Berets were “heartsick to help the heroes they loved” and had to
fight “their own shattered emotions first.” The novel contained many scenes of battle, though
unlike Moore’s Green Berets, these soldiers were proud of the civic action projects they were
implementing and contemptuous of reporters who ignored this good work and instead searched
for stories of combat heroics.161 Others novels were much the same, with various mixtures of
sexual intrigue, unreliable allies, and battlefield redemption.162 While the novels may well have
been attempts to capitalize on a trend, they also reveal a romantic notion of militarized
masculinity personified in an idealized soldier, one whom women gladly bedded and men longed
to be.
But these novels were merely part of a much larger cultural trend, one which gained
momentum with the release of the hit single “The Ballad of the Green Berets.” Written by Barry
Sadler, a Special Forces sergeant, this chart-topping song of 1966 was not the usual military fare.
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Less a glorification of combat and more an ode to men who die “for those oppressed,” the song
praised the courage, training, and exclusivity of “America’s best.” The song ended not with a
ringing victory, but with a soldier’s death, and his wish that his son one day test to “win the
green beret.”163 Robin Moore, in exchange for a half interest in Sadler’s song, wrote a few of the
lyrics and agreed to help promote the song.164 But the tie-ins didn’t end there. Sadler was
featured as the Green Beret on the paperback edition of Moore’s novel and during Moore’s
book-signings, he played Sadler’s record.165 The song was a run-away success, described
variously as “the single most popular song of 1966” and “RCA’s best selling single in
history.”166 In its advertising, RCA pushed Sadler’s song as “a hot new single with a ready-made
market of millions who have read the best-selling book, The Green Berets.”167 RCA also sent
radio stations, media outlets, and vendors a promotional kit that included Sadler’s biography,
pictures, and a Special Forces brochure.168
The U.S. Army was more than happy to capitalize on the publicity of Sadler’s song,
reassigning him to the Fort Bragg Public Information Office, whence he toured the country as a
“flesh-and-blood singing recruiting poster.”169 For the next eighteen months, Sadler was kept
busy with public appearances, playing the part of a media-manufactured hero, as he later
characterized it. Sadler, however, didn’t see himself as a hero, was tired of being a “figurehead,”
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and longed to return to his job as a Special Forces medic. He described the Vietnam War as “a
good little war. It was like everything you’d ever read in books, living with savages with their
teeth filed down to the bone, living on the edge, it was just a tremendous experience.”170 When
the Army refused to allow him to rejoin his unit, Sadler left the Army, which he said was like
“being kicked out of your own house by your father.” The military had been the only place he
“felt really comfortable” and–fifteen years after his honorable discharge–Sadler said he was “not
comfortable at all now” and probably never would be.171
Like The Green Berets, Sadler’s song also inspired young men to join Special Forces.
One of these young volunteers, Robert Kreger, said he heard the “Ballad of the Green Berets” on
his college PA system and made a bet with a friend as to “who was tougher,” who could become
a Green Beret faster.172 Kreger said he quit school that day, and went off in his own “little
fantasy world,” to prove himself manly, both in the eyes of his friends and of his father. While he
said he probably would have found some other “quest” if it hadn’t have been the Green Berets,
he admitted “the fact that at that moment at that place there was that song playing and the
heroism and the machoism involved in that song and the notion of a hundred men trying to make
it but only three” succeeding, was what inspired him to show that he could do something
exceptional.173 He never gave up on the idea that he could be in the Green Berets and pursued
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that goal by attending advanced infantry training and Officer Candidate School (OCS). After
OCS, he went to Fort Bragg, which he described as “a Muslim going to Mecca on the Haj.” To
see all the “physically fit strapping men walking around wearing their green berets” well it just
“gets you excited!” By the time Kreger graduated from training, he thought “bullets would
bounce right off” his chest.174
By the fall of 1966, popular culture was saturated with all things Green Beret. The retail
chain Grants ran an advertisement asking children what their favorite Halloween costume was.
Green Beret was listed above Zorro and the Munsters, right under Superman.175 A newspaper in
Michigan ran an article that declared the trend in toys was “shifting to jungle warfare,” and
“zooming to the front are GI Joe and Green Beret dolls.” Parents could rest easy, knowing that
“Pentagon experts served as advisors to the manufacturers.” Marx produced a Green Beret set
that came with doll, hat, guns, and two cap-firing grenades.176 Hasbro sold a Sears-exclusive G.I.
Joe Green Beret jungle outpost set, complete with two dolls, shell-firing bazooka, machine gun,
grenades, camouflaged netting, and other accessories.177 A machine gun outpost set was also
available.
If children joined the G.I. Joe club, they could send away for a record that told the story
of two young boys, Andy and George, who visit their friend Colonel Pat Lawrence to find out
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what it takes to become a Green Beret.178 Lawrence tells them the unit’s history and explains
their training: “every Green Beret has to be an expert at judo, karate, boxing, wrestling, and their
own special brand of hand-to-hand combat.” Lawrence then shares the story of the battle of Nam
Dong and the heroics of Captain Roger Donlon, after which Andy says, “Gee Colonel, those
Green Berets are terrific, that’s why I wanna be a Green Beret when I grow up!”179 The album
ends with a stirring rendition of “The Ballad of the Green Berets.” The final verses of the song,
in which a dying soldier requests that his son put silver wings on his chest and test to win the
green beret, took on new significance when played on a children’s album. As the war in Vietnam
dragged on and casualties continued to mount, G.I. Joe would move away from this symbolic
language of warfare and transform into more of a general action hero. But in these early years, he
was all man and he was a Green Beret.180
Action figures–boys did not play with “dolls”–were merely the beginning, however, as
retailers were determined to exploit the public’s interest in the Green Berets to whatever extent
they could. There were Green Beret-themed gumball machine toys which, for ten cents, gave
kids pin-on colonel’s rank or a plastic ring that held a small green beret. There was a U.S.
Special Forces Green Beret target set, which came with metal targets, printed with images of
soldiers in green berets in the thick of combat, and a dart gun. M & W Products made a green
beret that was sized for children, so they could pretend to be one of the “elite corps of the U.S.
Armed Forces.” While children had been playing war for decades, the Green Berets made it
possible to visualize oneself as an elite soldier, one who had mastered all manners of weapons
178
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and means of killing.181 To pretend to be one of Kennedy’s chosen soldiers would give one the
strength of ten anonymous infantry troops.
The Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corporation sold Green Beret trading cards for five cents
a pack, which were based upon the “J.F.K. Special Forces Center” at Fort Bragg. The set
consisted of 66 cards, plus a checklist, each with a U.S. Army photo of Special Forces training
and gear. There were Green Berets on skis, paddling a boat, rappelling, practicing martial arts,
taking down a sentry with a knife to the neck, and holding a giant snake. Once a child had
purchased the entire set, they could assemble an image from the reverse side of the cards. With
the caption, “Men of the Green Berets,” this illustration featured a portrait of a handsome, lightskinned beret-clad soldier in the foreground and various scenes of action in the background: a
night-time parachute jump, a scuba-diver rising from the water–knife at the ready–and a
helicopter dropping three Green Berets into action, guns blazing. For those kids who took the
time to read the cards’ captions, they could rest assured that this “modern swamp fox” was no
dummy, a Green Beret “uses his brains.”182
The Green Berets also began making more frequent appearances in comic strips and
comic books. Robin Moore’s syndicated strip, Tales of the Green Beret, ran for a short time,
though it never achieved the level of success of his novel on the Special Forces had.183 Unlike
Moore’s strip, most comic books on the Green Berets that were published in this period were
rather innocent depictions of what was happening in Vietnam. Like Moore’s work had done, they
oversold the abilities and expertise of the Green Berets, but they did not glorify killing in the
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same way The Green Berets had. Instead, they hewed closer to the Kennedy-era vision of Special
Forces as enlightened bestowers of development and freedom.
DC entered the fray by adding “Capt. Hunter” to their Our Fighting Forces comic.
Hunter was a Green Beret whose twin brother had been shot down over enemy territory and was
missing in action. Though Hunter was a civilian who quit the Army to go search for his brother
in the company of a lovely “Oriental kewpie doll,” he continued to wear his beret throughout the
series.184 The comic does not deal with Special Forces missions and was DC’s attempt to keep
things, in the words of the editor, “as real as tomorrow’s papers.”185 However, these comics
mirrored the vague ideas that the American public held of the American war in Vietnam as a
“savage war raging without quarter,” one that was “riddling the rules.”186
Our Fighting Forces notwithstanding, it was mainly smaller comic book publishers who
took on the Vietnam War.187 Tower Comics published stories of the Green Berets in Fight the
Enemy. Described as a “super soldier” who was trained to be both a “dynamic fighting force”
and a “true crusader of justice and defender of democracy,” the Special Forces trooper helped
“poor unfortunates who are caught in the path of destruction and hunger.”188 In one headscratching story, the Green Berets took a troublesome draftee soldier named Davis out on patrol.
Davis complained, saying he didn’t “want any part of this war.” He snuck away from the patrol,
thinking he might be able to “make a deal with the Cong.” However, when Davis saw the
violence the Viet Cong wrought on a small village, he attacked them, declaring that “I didn’t ask
for this war, but after seeing you butchers at work, that did it, someone has to stop your kind!”
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The Green Berets came to his rescue, overlooking his having abandoned their patrol, and Davis
promised to return to Vietnam “wearing a green beret.”189 While hardly a nuanced story, it did
demonstrate the ways in which Americans made sense of a war that seemed different, confusing,
and threatening through the promise of the men of the Green Berets.
Indeed, many of these comics read like recruiting stories for Special Forces. Army Attack,
for instance, featured a story titled “Is This the Hat for You?” which laid out standards and
training qualifications. But the picture of the soldiers painted by these comics was nothing that
had ever existed in reality, though many Americans believed that it did, and that expertise in
unconventional warfare would herald America’s victory over the communist threat in Southeast
Asia. Army Attack proclaimed that “it takes a man to reach out and set” the green beret on his
head.190 Once he did, he would be surrounded by men who spoke “as many as ten” languages,
who were expert frogmen, parachutists, or small boat handlers, men who would “improve the
country and people around them” when they deployed, teaching the people with whom they
worked “how to live better.”191 In other words, these American soldiers would make the world a
better place, a place remade in America’s image.
Even while bringing democracy to war torn countries, these elite soldiers could have a
little bit of good American fun, like “Muggsy,” the “Bird Colonel” from Army Attacks, whom the
Army brass tried to keep deskbound in Saigon. In Special Forces, though, you couldn’t keep a
good man down and Muggsy, “the most valuable combat man” in Vietnam, ignored official
orders and helicoptered into a village. Dozens of Green Berets followed him, parachuting in
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“noiseless and determined,” until twenty Chinese communists were dead and 400 Viet Cong
were trapped. Even then, the colonel refused to return to headquarters and snuck off on another
self-appointed mission.192
Similar myths perpetuated in the comics included a story in which a Green Beret used a
“rocket jumping belt,” much like the one demonstrated during Kennedy’s visit to Fort Bragg, to
singlehandedly attack a convoy of Viet Cong. The enemy died while screaming “Die, imperialist
aggressor!” and the lone American soldier expounded on how he was meant to fight “the bullies
who inflicted terror on unarmed villagers all over Vietnam” and all around the world.193 The first
volume of War Heroes saw Green Beret “advisors” refusing to shoot enemies, resorting instead
to martial arts skills to disarm threats. They only used guns in defense or to save the life of a
child–a chivalric concept that was outdated long before the comic’s publication in 1965.194
Unlike DC’s Capt. Hunter, these stories all displayed an innocence that was reflective of
Kennedy’s new frontier soldiers. The Green Berets in these comics may have disobeyed orders
and saved runaway draftees, but they had a purity of heart that elevated them above the violence
of their actions. And while some scholars have been dismissive of the silliest comic story of the
genre, Super Green Beret, it was more a purification of the myth than a divergence.195 Tod
Holton, the comic’s hero, was a young boy who received magical superpowers when he donned
his green beret. With them, he became a “super soldier,” who battled oppression and injustice
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“the whole world over.”196 However, Holton simply accomplished through magical powers what
the Green Berets in other comics accomplished through their training and righteousness of cause
and ideology. The means might have been different, but the fairy tale was the same.
By late 1966, the idea that there was a “Green Beret myth” had become well-established.
Look magazine published an article reminding their readers that “the Special Forces in Vietnam
has scant opportunity for the blood ‘n’ thunder antics attributed to it in novels, comic strips and
pop songs at home.”197 Nine pages of prose and photographs highlighted the noble efforts of
three men from a Special Forces team in Dak Pek: a fighter, a healer, and a builder. The “fighter”
was pictured wearing brass bracelets and a beaded necklace, evidence of his “blood-brother
acceptance by the montagnards.”198 The “healer” carried his rifle only “grudgingly” while
administering medical aid to villagers.199 The “builder” was a “gunslinging schoolteacher,”
whose job it was “to guide the montagnards into the 20th century.” The article noted he was “one
of the few Americans to learn” the tribal dialect and he was in the process of “devising an
alphabet for the tribe.”200 But this image of the Green Berets, as the soldiers who had proven
they could “master the kind of wars Americans are going to have to learn how to fight,” was no
less a myth than were the “blood ‘n’ thunder antics” of their popular culture portrayal.201 Once
again, the Green Berets had demonstrated their ability to be all things for all people.
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Public interest in the Green Berets waned somewhat as the war in Vietnam dragged on.202
However, John Wayne’s 1968 box-office triumph, The Green Berets, refocused the country’s
attention. Less a retelling of Moore’s novel and more an idealized vision of the Green Beret as
savior, the film was the final Vietnam-era contribution to the mythology. To obtain the necessary
assistance in making the film, Wayne had written directly to President Johnson, explaining that
he wanted to let Americans know “what’s going on over there.”203 Before filming could begin,
however, the military had to approve a script, a back-and-forth process which took
approximately eighteen months.204 Ultimately, the film was produced with the full support of the
U.S. Army. As one of the directors said during filming, “You wouldn’t get these planes and these
choppers and these soldiers and everything around here unless they wanted this picture made.”205
Just as Moore’s novel and Sadler’s song had been, Wayne’s movie was panned by major
media critics but embraced by many lesser media outlets and the public.206 One critic in
Pennsylvania found Wayne’s film less of the “crackerjack” adventure story that Moore’s best
seller had been, calling the film a “cliché ridden, wooden account” of Green Beret missions in
Vietnam.207 A critic in Minnesota thought the film’s violence was “almost like watching two
scorpions fight to the death in a glass box. How do you choose sides?”208 Others found cross-
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country fault with both the critical reviews from the “New York weirdos” and the failure of the
Hollywood “liberals and their media flunkies” to produce more anti-communist films.209 A
columnist in Arizona, while noting the film was a “mixed bag,” attributed the critical censure to
Wayne’s “temerity to film a movie” that offended the critics’ “political views.”210 A reviewer
from Mississippi agreed, remarking that “despite the contempt so many pinkish critics have for
him,” Wayne was one of America’s top talents. The reviewer opined that the box-office success
of Wayne’s film indicated that America supported our “fighting men in Vietnam,” the heroes
who helped “hold the line against Communism.”211
The scholarly literature on Wayne’s film tends to focus on the withering critical reviews,
the military’s involvement in the script, and its value and intent as propaganda.212 And it may
indeed be true that, as one scholar argues, the “overwhelmingly negative reactions” to the film
“revealed how deeply faith in crucial Cold War myths had declined.”213 However, what is
overlooked is that the myth of the Green Berets was in no way diminished by the flaws of the
movie. Indeed, even Renata Adler, in her famously caustic review for the New York Times,
thought “the film could not be more false or do a greater disservice” to our soldiers.214
In fact, most critics who panned the film stopped to acknowledge the exceptionalism of
the Green Berets. Time thought Wayne’s movie was an “absurd and blundering epic.” However,
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“the real Green Berets,” run “the most economic and perhaps the most unusual operation in the
war,” with a “seemingly limitless supply of gall and resourcefulness.”215 The New York Times
published an article, “U.S. Special Forces: Real and on Film,” alongside Adler’s review. The
article found that while authenticity was “one of the earliest” casualties in the movie, the real-life
soldiers of the Special Forces were “wonderfully proficient, likeable men.”216 A reviewer for the
Atlanta Constitution called the film a two and a half hour “paean to the Special Forces,” which
was “a valid intention.” Unfortunately, the one-dimensional characters and wooden dialogue
were “unfair to the members of the Special Forces.”217
The movie is also useful in revealing the image that the military had of itself and of the
war it was fighting in Vietnam.218 The Army had stated it would not approve a script unless it
conformed “with the mission of Special Forces in Vietnam.”219 The fact that it approved the
script and gave Wayne’s production the requested assistance indicates that this was a story the
Army and the Department of Defense wanted told. But to dismiss this as propaganda overlooks
its revelatory value. If we examine the film, several salient scenarios emerge: at least three
members of Colonel Kirby’s team spoke Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese commander with
whom the Americans allied themselves was a true leader and a good soldier, and when the Green
Berets demonstrated their good intentions, the local villagers were quick to believe in them and
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stand up to the Viet Cong.220 These are all myths, but they are myths that the American military–
and the American public–accepted for much of the United States’ early years in Vietnam. Not
surprisingly, the Green Berets were not only the personification of these myths. They helped
perpetuate them as well.
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4 Green Berets in Vietnam, 1965-1970
The popular myth of the Green Berets rested on the assumption that these worldly
soldiers of Kennedy’s New Frontier would bring American ideals of progress and democracy to
the Global South and win the battle against the spread of communism. Their language skills,
their extensive military training, their capabilities as teachers, and their medical and scientific
prowess would all be applied to the betterment of South Vietnam and the inevitable victory over
the communist guerrilla forces of the north. This was not what actually happened in Vietnam,
however, where the reality of the war had little relation to the Green Berets’ myth.
The U.S. Army Special Forces’ viewpoint of the war it was fighting in Vietnam can be
ascertained in the pages of their official magazine, the Green Beret. In August 1966, the 5th
Special Forces Group began publishing a monthly magazine that highlighted the
accomplishments and struggles of teams deployed throughout Vietnam. Until the end of the
CIDG program and the withdrawal of most of the Green Berets from Vietnam in 1970, this
magazine documented their missions. The brainchild of Colonel Francis Kelly, commander of
the Special Forces in Vietnam from June 1966 to June 1967, the magazine was intended to be a
source of information and motivation for his men.221 Of course, the publicity value of the
magazine as a “handout for visiting dignitaries” didn’t hurt Kelly’s cause.222
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In the words of one New York Times reporter, Kelly took command of Special Forces
determined to “restore it to the regular Army, from which a good many of his superiors believed
it had strayed.”223 This mindset was reflected in the magazine’s reporting, which noted that the
“Special Forces soldier is a member of the Army Team, soldiers doing a soldier’s job.”224 This
was true despite the “many things” that had been “said and written” about the “capabilities and
accomplishments of the Green Berets.”225 While Special Forces Command itself had worked
hard to promote media interest in the unit, including publicizing “The Ballad of the Green
Berets,” the public image had grown beyond their control.226 Kelly and other commanders in
Vietnam desired to minimize the animosity this had created between conventional units
commanders and the Special Forces.227
A recurring theme throughout the magazine’s run was the importance of the
counterinsurgency mission to U.S. strategy in Vietnam. In the magazine’s first edition, Kelly
argued that the “counterinsurgency situation” required that combat actions be undertaken
alongside civic action. The mission began with “finding and destroying the enemy” and ended
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with helping “the Vietnamese people to help themselves.”228 Articles on medical aid programs,
livestock development projects, and other civic action initiatives filled the magazines’ pages. In
fact, according to the Green Beret, Special Forces was responsible for 42 percent of “total
Military Civic Action effort in the Republic of Vietnam” in 1966.229 An effort was made to note
that these projects were undertaken jointly with the South Vietnamese government and that the
townspeople “not only understand and appreciate the efforts being made on their behalf, but also
willingly help in the tasks.”230
Success in these projects was something that could be measured: metrics were what
mattered. One article listed numbers of medical treatments, construction projects, and poundage
of aid delivered in support of the statement: “All this indicates that civil activities are keeping
abreast of military operations.”231 Other articles simply equated aid disbursement with winning
the support of the people. For instance, when the Viet Cong burned the village of Khoa Truong,
American and Vietnamese Special Forces soldiers worked hand in hand to help get the villagers
back on their feet. The local people saw the results of the project and their attitude “changed
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from apathy, to support of the government.”232 This assertion was the same one made in
Wayne’s film: good deeds win hearts and minds.
As if to demonstrate these elite soldiers’ ability to shed their “ugly American” ways and
work side-by-side with the locals, articles also referenced examples of American and Vietnamese
cooperation. During one assault, a Special Forces officer noted how proud he was to have the
Vietnamese troops in his command.233 Pictures that accompanied the magazine’s articles show
Vietnamese officers and American soldiers working alongside each other as co-equal partners.234
However, this image of amicable working relations was belied by a message from the Special
Forces commander in early 1969. Colonel Harold Aaron informed his men that “the respect of
the Vietnamese military and civilians must be maintained or the entire US effort in Vietnam is in
danger of being nullified.” To that end, he instructed commanders to take “vigorous” measures to
ensure proper conduct towards the Vietnamese Special Forces.235 However, problems remained,
because several commanders later, the men of 5th Special Forces Group were reminded that “a
close and harmonious relationship” with Vietnamese Special Forces soldiers was of the “utmost
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importance” in accomplishing the mission.236 Soldiers were ordered to share information, to
coordinate their operations, and to “approach problem areas with understanding and insight.”237
In early 1968, the editor of the Green Beret magazine, Jim Morris, wrote an article about
the overly glamorized image of Special Forces. He noted that because stories of “action, passion,
adventure, sex” are what readers prefer, those are the articles that get published.238 Even though
much of the success of Special Forces–“even combat success”–was due to civic action, few
readers were interested about stories not tied directly to battlefield combat.239 Morris
recommended that soldiers stop worrying about their image and just get on with doing their jobs:
“winning this war.”240 However, Morris himself had decided to join the Army after reading an
article in the Saturday Evening Post that was heavy on action, adventure, and the excitement of
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killing.241 When he arrived in Vietnam and was assigned to work on the Green Beret, he
complained that it was a “useless” job. All Morris wanted to do “was get back out in the woods
with troops, kill some VC, and get the old adrenalin flowing.”242
Morris was not the only Green Beret who had been inspired by these warrior visions or
who desired to test the notions of manhood being the result of surviving through the crucible of
war. Veteran Bill Siemer described his own motivation in a poem:
I didn’t come here
For the cause they tout
The slogans they spout
Killing a commie for Christ
Is not what I’m about
I came to see
What war does to me.243
Siemer explained that his father had never gone to war and that it “left him wondering if he owed
the store.” Siemer felt that he had a duty to pay his father’s “tab” and, in the process, become a
man himself.244 Others were intrigued by the idea of being “jungle killers” or professional
soldiers, finally able to put their many months of training to the test in Southeast Asia.245
Despite the popular media’s infatuation with combat, and veterans’ curiosity about it, the
heart of the Special Forces mission in Vietnam was the CIDG program. And while the
Americans were mostly successful in gaining the loyalty of the Montagnard tribes, this loyalty
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did not transfer seamlessly to the Saigon government, the overriding objective of American
strategy in South Vietnam.246 The Montagnard uprisings of 1964 and 1965 were but two of the
most visible results of this inability to truly pacify the countryside and indicated that while these
troops might be an effective fighting force in the short term, their long-term willingness to
support the local, noncommunist government could not be guaranteed.247
Indeed, there were some within Special Forces who themselves would have sided with
the Montagnards over the government of South Vietnam.248 Many Green Berets shared the
opinion of Robert Kreger, who had the “utmost respect” for the Montagnard people.249 Jim
Morris, in relating his time in Vietnam, said he was a soldier because he “loved the
Montagnards, the jungle and parachuting.” A decade after his three deployments to Vietnam, he
described himself as “as much Montagnard as American,” because he had staked his life for their
cause.250 An Army physician who studied Special Forces noted that while “relations with their
Vietnamese counterparts are always strained,” team members “make a strong distinction between
the Vietnamese and the Montagnard soldiers.”251 Another soldier remarked that the men of
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Special Forces “saved their dislike for the Vietnamese and were openly contemptuous of their
indigenous counterparts.”252 Such paradoxes, however, never made their way into official
wartime publications lest the Saigon government become offended.
Another aspect of the Green Beret mythology that diverged widely from the reality of the
Vietnam era was the Americans’ supposed linguistic mastery. One Green Beret medic said he
had never met a fellow Green Beret who spoke Vietnamese and had only even heard of a single
Special Forces soldier who spoke fluent Vietnamese.253 Another soldier joked, “Sure, I’m
bilingual. I talk English and vulgar.”254 If you excluded German, Spanish, and French, the
number who spoke a foreign language was described by one veteran as a “fractional
minority.”255 Robert Shippen, who had received some language training at Fort Bragg, conceded
that he couldn’t really speak Vietnamese, or even understand it.256 “Almost useless,” was how
another soldier described the “superficial” training he had received before deploying.257 Others
admitted that despite the romantic media image, “few if any” Green Berets were close to the
level of expertise the public imagined.258
In fact, many soldiers became increasingly skeptical that the civic action projects they
were involved in could win the loyalty of the local people. Special Forces medic Aaron
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Gritzmaker, who participated in several such projects in Tra Bong felt that “we were not winning
the hearts and minds by any means.” Nevertheless, he enjoyed being a “cowboy” in the “Wild
West” and claimed he would probably still be there “if the war was still going on.”259 Norm
Gardner, an executive officer of a Special Forces team west of Nha Trang, was responsible for
implementing his team’s civic action projects. While he believed in the concept of civic action,
he found that in reality it was more of a “slap dab effort,” with no long-term planning. As
“commands changed, as people changed, efforts changed,” making continuity and planning
virtually impossible. His team refurbished schools, subsidized teachers’ salaries, and rebuilt
bridges, which he believed the people appreciated. However, he noted that appreciation did not
translate into winning the support of the people. In his view, “they would just take whatever they
could get from whoever gave it and do the best they could.”260
The concept of Green Berets as enlightened soldiers who won the hearts of native people
everywhere simply did not accord with reality. Medic Thomas Perry wrote home to his wife
daily before he was killed in action during a rescue mission. Perry worked at the hospital in Da
Nang, where he came into contact with scores of other soldiers. A draft-motivated enlistee, Perry
joined the Special Forces because he believed Kennedy’s counterinsurgency aim of winning
hearts and minds through civic action. However, after having been in Vietnam for several
months, he was disgusted by the “absolutely appalling treatment of the Vietnamese people” that
he daily witnessed. Vietnamese people were not allowed to be transported in U.S. military
vehicles without proper paperwork. Local nationals were not allowed to drink in the American
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clubs on base and large signs on U.S. officer and enlisted latrines read “American only.” The
Vietnamese soldiers were forced to use the “sorriest, smallest latrine on the compound.”261
This discrimination also took place at the personal level, and while it might not have been
noteworthy in a “normal” military operation, in counterinsurgency warfare, winning the support
of the local people was everything. Perry observed that the professional U.S. soldiers, those who
had made the military their career, treated the locally hired help abysmally. The Vietnamese men
were “ignored unless they fail[ed] to perform their duties,” in which case they were forced. But
Perry was especially critical of how the women were regarded.
The women are all treated like tramps. They are fondled, insulted, slapped on the ass,
screamed at, driven to tears, bear hugged; they are constantly and continuously
approached sexually, no matter how married, how many children, how ugly. It is
behavior which generates loathing on the part of the indigenous women. There is a
tenseness about the women here (the secretaries, floor sweepers, nurses) that underlies
their participation in the banter, flirting, and sexual passes they are in contact with here
every day.262
The mistreatment of Vietnamese women intimated much deeper problems with the myth
of the Green Berets. In reality, the American war in Southeast Asia turned out to be far more
complicated than popular myths promised. The political-military struggle inside South Vietnam
proved far messier, far more difficult to control than most Americans had anticipated. Even
highly trained soldiers, like those who wore the green beret, could not solve local social,
political, and economic problems over which the Vietnamese themselves were fighting. True,
these men were highly skilled in combat and trained in nonmilitary endeavors like civic action
and pacification. Yet this training, on which so many of the myths were founded, could not
resolve what, at its core, was always an internal Vietnamese struggle. In the end, the American
myths of the heroic, unvanquished Green Beret never lived up to their promises.
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Conclusion
By early 1971, the last of the CIDG camps were transferred to the Republic of Vietnam’s
Armed Forces and the Green Berets ceased to function as an official unit in Vietnam. Yet even as
the American war was coming to a close in Southeast Asia, the public had not entirely lost
interest in these elite soldiers and numerous media articles wondered what would happen to
“yesterday’s heroes” now that they had returned home.263 In fact, much of the media coverage
remained flattering, despite the downturn of support for the war. The Miami Herald proclaimed
that the “fabled Green Berets” had a “proud role” in Vietnam. Other, lesser, units might have
“long since lost most of their identity in Vietnam,” but the Green Berets “played their own game
to the end.”264 Meanwhile, Time announced that “as the war has turned, the nimbus of heroism
dissolved” from these “Apaches with diplomas from Fort Bragg.”265 But the coverage reflected
more a diminished enthusiasm for America’s aims in Vietnam than dissatisfaction with the
Green Berets themselves. There was almost a feeling of disappointment in the reporting, a
nostalgia for the past promise of a triumphant future that had dimmed. And though most articles
again parroted the litany of their skills, the underlying concern seemed to be what would become
of them now.
Throughout the 1970s, newspapers continued to publish articles about the Green Berets,
and reporters kept track of their fortunes as they did no other military unit. The war may have
“eventually slipped out from under their combat boots,” but they were “tough, patriotic, God-
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fearing men” nonetheless.266 Perhaps the wistfulness had something to do with their having left
Vietnam before the war was truly lost in the eyes of the American public. Regardless, the Green
Berets were distinct from other Vietnam veterans. They never belonged to the paradigm of
“innocence savaged and destroyed” by war, as Paul Fussell argues happened in World War I or
as historian Christian Appy shows developed into one of the postwar cultural myths from
Vietnam.267 Media reports referred to the “fabled Green Berets” as possibly the “only American
soldiers who liked the Vietnam war.”268 A writer for the Associated Press stated “the mere
mention of the Green Berets conjures up images of men who loved the danger and excitement of
war in Southeast Asia.”269
Even early post-Vietnam media portrayals of the veteran as victim held the Green Berets
in an elevated regard relative to other combat soldiers. In The Deer Hunter, it was Michael, the
Green Beret, who was triumphant and whose skills freed his friends from captivity. His
psychological wounds are superficial, in contrast to the paralyzing physical and mental injuries
of his friends, Steven and Nick.270 Those who had been to Vietnam found little they recognized
in director Michael Cimino’s film, but that did not stop audiences from filling theaters or
Hollywood from nominating The Deer Hunter for nine Academy Awards.271 Despite its billing
as an anti-war film, The Deer Hunter actually perpetuated American notions of heroism and
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patriotism through the myth of the Green Berets.272 Their legend as “super-soldiers” had
survived a bloody and unpopular war, both in news media accounts and on the big screen.273 So
when the film won the Academy Award for Best Picture in 1979, it was only fitting that John
Wayne, the gunslinging patriot himself, presented the award.274
It was not until the 1980s, however, that the Green Berets appeared on the silver screen in
all their masculine glory. During the Reagan presidency, the ultimate Hollywood personification
of the Special Forces as mythic warriors could be found in Sylvester Stallone’s depiction of John
Rambo. While the Rambo series relied on the traumatized veteran trope, his redemption would
ultimately lay in his frontier warfare skills. And these skills were not acquired in the Boy Scouts,
nor were they God-given.275 As Colonel Trautman declared in First Blood, “God didn’t make
Rambo. I made him.” Trautman’s enumeration of Rambo’s skills appeared to have been lifted
directly from 1960s media coverage of the Green Berets. Rambo was an “expert in guerrilla
warfare,” a master of killing with guns, knives, or with his bare hands. He could “live off the
land” and “eat things that would make a billy goat puke.”276 In director Ted Kotcheff’s 1982
film, Rambo descended a mountainous rock face, sewed up his own wounds, and hunted wild
boar. Even the explosive arrows Rambo used in later films were straight out of early media
articles on the Green Berets.277
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The films also presented the fantasy that if these super soldiers had just been allowed to
do their job, then the United States would not have “lost” the war in Vietnam. As Rambo told
Trautman, “I did what I had to do to win. But somebody wouldn’t let us win.”278 Redemption
thus fell within the purview of the Green Berets, for through Rambo, the war in Vietnam could
be refought and this time, it could be won. In Rambo: First Blood Part II, Rambo not only
defeated the North Vietnamese, but also the Soviets and his own country’s bureaucrats to bring
American POWs home: “Mission accomplished.”279 Predator allowed for a similar fiction,
though the Arnold Schwarzenegger flick featured Green Berets in Central America taking on an
extraterrestrial. Still, the themes of government betrayal, of elite soldiers surviving through their
mastery of frontier skills, and of using the enemy’s own weapons against him were the same.
It is important to note, however, that the core themes within these 1980s action movies
had long cultural roots. The Kennedy-era myth of the Green Berets as America’s soldiers of
democratic progress was compelling to many young men. The problem, though, was that these
soldiers’ idealism rarely survived the reality of the war they experienced in Vietnam. Thomas
Perry, who spoke of “drawing closer to the truth behind the myth of Special Forces,” had
expected to be working with men who understood the “large scope of the war,” who could “work
successfully with a rifle squad or with a Montagnard village.”280 But he was disheartened to
encounter no one in Vietnam who fit the image he had been sold. Likewise, he had expected to
be fighting die-hard communists, but instead realized, “we’re here killing nationalists most of the
time.”281 Donald Duncan, a Green Beret turned anti-war activist, also went to Vietnam
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ideologically motivated, though his support for his government’s cause soon faded. Duncan was
“completely taken aback” by the contempt his fellow soldiers expressed toward the Vietnamese
government, soldiers, and civilians.282 After all, these were the very people upon whose support
the counterinsurgency effort depended. Like many of his veteran peers, Duncan became
increasingly aware of the incongruity between the official stance of the U.S. military and the
reality of the situation on the ground.
Even many of those young men who joined the Special Forces to experience combat as
part of an elite group of soldiers were similarly disillusioned with the war. James McLeroy
became “extremely demoralized” when he was expected to train and lead CIDG troops, whom he
found to be “absolutely worthless.”283 He wanted to “get with some guys who were out to win
the war and kill the enemy and take it to them.” But after moving to a more combat-oriented
posting, he only grew more “bitter and disillusioned” with the way the war was being waged.284
Reflecting on his service in Vietnam, McLeroy admitted that he would have been happier
leading an elite infantry unit rather than indigenous troops. Duncan said he had observed many
men like McLeroy in Vietnam, “self-styled John Waynes,” who complained about being “forced
to build schools and distribute food” when their “real job” should have been “killing Viet
Cong.”285
That such aspiring soldiers as Perry and McLeroy, with dissimilar motivations for joining
the Special Forces, could be inspired by the same myth is a testament to the power of the popular
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folklore that has surrounded the Green Berets since their founding. It is a problem that persists to
this day. In her 1997 study on the Special Forces, anthropologist Anna Simons remarked upon
the divide that existed within each team between those who preferred pure combat mission and
those who took to heart the demands of more politically based missions such as training foreign
fighters.286 Other scholars have made similar arguments. For instance, political scientist Michael
McClintock maintains that the “fiction that Special Forces can be both Rambo-style warriors and
sensitive development workers who can diagnose and defuse internal unrest through civic action
has yet to be dispelled.”287 But it is this duality that gives the myth its staying power and led to
its recrudescence in the Global War on Terror.
In 2008, the Department of Defense released an hour-long film, Why We Fight Now: The
Global War on Terror.288 While the film touted the capabilities of the Special Forces as the
premier unconventional warriors of the twenty-first century, at heart, it merely parroted
Kennedy-era stereotypes. Themes of the Special Forces as warrior diplomats, the importance of
winning hearts and minds, and protecting American shores by taking the fight to the enemy ran
throughout the film. In this way, the myth is kept alive for a new generation, demonstrating that
what was past is still present. For though the enemy may have changed, the heroic warrior-savior
still wears a green beret.
Myths reflect deeply held societal beliefs, which is precisely what makes them so
powerful. For this reason, they can also be incredibly dangerous. The warrior mystique of the
Green Berets in the Vietnam era not only provided the American public with a “hero” figure, it
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also gave them a way by which to imagine that victory in a largely unconventional war was
possible. That myth survives to this day. A monument to the horse soldiers of 5th Special Forces
Group, who rode to “victory” in Afghanistan, stands on the grounds of Liberty Park, the former
site of the World Trade Center. However, despite billions of dollars and nearly twenty years of
fighting, the United States has not defeated the Taliban. The myth survives in popular culture as
well. Quentin Tarantino was criticized when his film Once Upon a Time in Hollywood portrayed
Bruce Lee losing a fight to the protagonist stuntman, Cliff. Tarantino dismissed his critics by
explaining that Cliff was a Green Beret, a warrior, who was used to killing men in unarmed
combat. For sixty years, then, the mythology has served as a tool to suit the needs of politicians,
the media, the military, and the larger American public.
Continuing to lionize the Special Forces has consequences, however. One of which is that
it enables continued, robust, and global interventionism. Civilian and military leaders rely on
Special Forces teams to solve thorny foreign policy problems with minimal public debate or
attention. The American public, meanwhile, acquiesces because it understands the versatility and
expertise of these warrior diplomats. But even the best-trained soldiers are not social scientists
and allowing the Army to be a vehicle of “progress” in the Global South assumes a degree of
sophistication and cultural awareness that is belied by the historical data.
Deconstructing the mythology of the Green Berets as “gunslinging schoolteachers”
reveals the faulty assumptions that undergird American foreign policy. After all, the notion that
Special Forces soldiers can enter a foreign country and truly understand the needs of the local
populace–and then help transform that society–is the embodiment of cultural superiority. It is
hubris to make foreign policy decisions on deploying armed forces abroad when those decisions
are based on an uncritical faith in the superiority of “elite” western soldiers. Such assumptions
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blind policymakers to alternative options that might be better suited for local conditions and
beliefs. Whether or not Green Berets can assist in nation building is a different question than
asking whether they should. American modernization ideals of democracy, capitalism, and social
progress are not going to be the one-size-fits-all solution to the world’s problems. Pretending
otherwise, and presuming that our soldiers, even our most elite, can remake the world in
America’s image is a dangerous conceit. The Green Berets were never everything that their myth
promised but that is only because the myth of American exceptionalism was, and continues to
be, so appealing. We cannot teach other nations the best way to govern, the optimal manner in
which to build their markets, or to grow their crops. These are local decisions and they have local
ramifications that American military personnel can never fully comprehend. The mistakes we, as
a nation, made in Vietnam have been repeated in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is time to look past the
myth and ask ourselves: are our elite warriors gunslingers or are they diplomats? Because they
cannot be both.
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